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1. Why Study Reenlistment Behavior?
During the all volunteer force (AVF) era, the
Department of Defense (DOD) has spent a considerable amount
of time, money and effort on increasing the reenlistment
rates of the various services. The two primary reasons for
this are first, that each reenlistment reduces the need to
recruit and train new personnel, thus reducing costs.
Second^ in an increasingly technical military, the loss of
highly trained noncommissioned officers (NCO) cannot easily
be replaced with new recruits. Therefore, as both cost
containment, and quality enhancement, a high reenlistment
rate is essential to today's military force.
While the services have met with great success in
retaining personnel since about 1981, several factors
suggest that it will become increasingly difficult in the
years ahead. [Ref. l:pp. 94-105] These reasons are the
"birth dearth" generation which is coming to military age
now and the improvement in the economy since the late 70 's
and early 80' s. [Ref. 2] A recent study estimated that
during the 1990' s there will be about 25 percent fewer
nineteen-year-olds than there were in the 1980' s. [Ref. 3:
p. 3] The improved civilian economy will be in direct
competition for this labor. Since it will be increasingly
difficult and costly to attract and retain these men and
women, we must know all we can about what motivates them to
stay in the service. [Ref. 4:p. 2]
Optimal force mix is another reason to study
reenlistment behavior. How much of our forces do we want or
need to be career oriented versus first termers? While
second tour and beyond personnel are increasingly valuable
in many occupations, first tour personnel are adequate and
even preferred in some jobs and ranks. If we were to raise
the military wage high enough we could fill our ranks with
second tour members. Conversely, a low enough wage would
keep everyone from reenlisting (assuming there was some
inducement to enlist them in the first place) . The
determination of optimal mix will not be studied in this
thesis. This thesis deals with how the Marine Corps can
attempt to manipulate pay and benefits as well as living and
working conditions to maintain the optimal mix, once its
level has been determined.
2 . Economic Considerations
The essence of the reenlistment decision is: "Does
the present value of military pay and non-pecuniary factors
exceed the present value of civilian pay and non-pecuniary
factors?" This is an extension of reservation wage theory
which states that we
...assume each individual attempts to maximize the value
of a utility function with the usual properties whose
arguments are the characteristics of jobs. Then, there is
a level of military pecuniary returns—the reservation
wage
—
just sufficient to induce the individual to
reenlist. The reservation wage would compensate the
individual not only for foregone civilian pecuniary
returns, but also for substituting military nonpecuniary
characteristics for those in the civilian sector. [Ref.
5:p. 4]
The problem is determining the eguivalent monetary value of
the various pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors which affect
military life. It would be difficult enough to accurately
evaluate the monetary alternatives facing a potential
reenlistee, but considering the nonmonetary factors makes
the problem seem overwhelming. Consider the difficulty in
comparing military compensation to civilian compensation.
Military pay is composed of base pay and a variety of pays
and allowances, some of which are rendered in kind. For
example, basic allowance for guarters (BAQ) and variable
housing allowance (VHA) are paid if a member is not assigned
to government guarters. Can we assume that the combined
amounts of BAQ and VHA represent the monetary value of
living in family guarters on base? When considering the
value of base housing we must remember that it includes
utilities, maintenance, a school system, no taxes, a short
commute to work, fire protection and security as well as a
general support system of neighbors who understand most of
your problems. Also the value and availability of base
housing varies with the location of each assignment. Other
pays and allowances as well as tax advantages and value of
the retirement program further compound the problem of
comparing military with civilian pay.
On the nonpecuniary side of the problem we have
items such as medical and dental care, regular family
separations, personal risk, frequent moves, and undesirable
tour locations. Some of these factors are seen as benefits
by some people, while others see them as disadvantages. For
example, some members may look at unaccompanied overseas
tours as a chance to escape family responsibilities for a
while. Others see personal risk as an exciting adventure.
While still others look forward to moving. Wearing a
uniform and being part of a unique organization is another
nonpecuniary aspect which can have both negative and
positive effects.
Other differences between military service and
civilian employment include: formal long-term enlistment
contracts, almost exclusively entry-level hiring, using job
training as a recruitment incentive, 24-hour-a-day
availability, and short notice transfers to remote
locations, to name a few.
The reasons why a person enlisted can be the reason
he or she gets out. For example, those who enlist for
specific training or GI Bill benefits maximize the value of
these incentives by using them as soon as possible, i.e., by
leaving at the end of the first enlistment.
The problem, then, is how to model and evaluate the
many variables which comprise the reenlistment decision for
over 30,000 members of the Marine Corps each year. [Ref. 1:
pp. 94-97] In order to "market" a military career the
Marine Corps must know what factors influence the
reenlistment decision. To what extent do pay, job
satisfaction and family considerations sway the decision
process? Certainly, the Marine Corps can attract adequate
numbers of reenlistees merely by increasing pay sufficiently
or by paying large enough bonuses, but will they retain the
best NCO's by this method, and is it the most cost effective
means? Perhaps the higher quality men and women place more
emphasis on job satisfaction and quality of life factors.
If so, they could possibly be persuaded to reenlist with
improvements in these areas at a lower cost than with
increases in pay. Logic would indicate that a person whose
skills command a higher wage in the civilian economy would
not choose, without receiving some other benefits, to remain
in the military where one never knows if and when he or she
will be called on to make the ultimate sacrifice. Knowledge
of the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
variables in the reenlistment decision is crucial to the
decisions of how much money to spend in each area.
This thesis will focus on the non-pecuniary factors
influencing the reenlistment behavior of first and second
term Marine Corps enlisted men and women. 1 The impact of
these factors will be observed through the use of survey
data.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis answers the following questions.
- What are the effects on reenlistment behavior of a
Marine's level of satisfaction with aspects of military-
life such as pay, job satisfaction, and family
environment?
- How do the effects of these and other variables differ
among different occupational fields?
- Is intention to reenlist correlated closely enough with
actual behavior to allow researchers to use intention to
predict actual behavior data?
1For the sake of brevity, "he" and "him" will be used
to refer to Marines of either sex.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. GENERAL
Previous studies of reenlistment behavior can be roughly
divided into two categories: those whose primary focus has
been on various aspects of pecuniary influences, versus
those which try to capture the effects of nonpecuniary
variables. Of the studies dealing primarily with pay, those
using the annualized cost of leaving approach (ACOL) appear
to emerge with general acceptance. Examples of these
studies are: "Reenlistment Bonuses and First-Term
Retention" by Enns [Ref. 6], "An Empirical Analysis of Pay
and Navy Enlisted Retention in the AVF: Preliminary
Results" by Warner and Simon [Ref. 7], and "The Effects of
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses on Retention" by Cymrot
[Ref. 8]. Of the studies which examine nonpay variables
three studies are widely quoted: "Models of the First Term
Reenlistment Decision" by Chow and Polich (1980) [Ref. 9],
"The Influence of Non-Pecuniary Factors on Labor Supply:
The Case of Navy Enlisted Personnel" by Warner and Goldberg
(1981) [Ref. 10], and "Relating Attitudes Toward Navy Life
to Reenlistment Decisions" by Fletcher and Giesler (1981)
[Ref. 11]. A comparison of these studies follows.
B. STUDIES FOCUSING ON PECUNIARY INFLUENCES
The ACOL approach theorizes that a person facing the
reenlistment decision would incur a reduction in the present
value of his expected military earnings over the term of the
enlistment if he leaves the service. His earnings include
any reenlistment bonus and usually discounts future earnings
at 10%, although studies have estimated that personnel less
than 25 years old have discount rates as high as 20%. [Ref.
12] These personnel are also assumed to have a preference
for civilian life upon which they can, at least subcon-
sciously, place a monetary cost. After comparing the
present values of his military and civilian earnings over
the term of the future enlistment period, an individual
determines whether staying in is monetarily more attractive.
He is then assumed to compare the differential between the
earnings (the ACOL) to his monetary estimate of his
preference for civilian life. If the ACOL exceeds the value
of his positive taste for civilian life, he will reenlist;
if not, he will leave the service. Implicit in this process
is a person's ability to accurately estimate the value of
his future military earnings (difficult enough) , the value
of his potential civilian earnings (considerably more
difficult) , and the monetary value of his preference for
civilian life (assuming that he does, in fact, have a
preference for civilian life) . Obviously if the value of
civilian earnings exceeds the value of military earnings or
a person has a preference for military life, the choice is
much simpler. At the first reenlistment point, reenlistment
bonuses are very important in increasing the value of
military earnings above civilian earnings, especially for
those with skills that are readily transferred to civilian
life. At second and subsequent reenlistment points, bonuses
become less important as personal discount rates decrease
and the value of retirement becomes important. The ACOL
approach has been used to determine pay elasticities and the
effects of alternative retirement systems on retention.
Some of the findings follow.
Enns [Ref. 6] examined the effects of bonuses on first
term reenlistment. Using 1971-1974 (pre-SRB) data he
modelled the reenlistment rate as a function of pay and
bonuses while controlling for demographic variables such as
race, education level, mental aptitude, dependents and entry
age. His estimates of pay elasticities ranged from 2.1
(Army) to 3 . 4 (Air Force) with the Navy rate at 2 . 58 . He
also examined the Army data to estimate the effects of lump
sum versus installment bonuses and found that lump sum
bonuses had a greater effect.
Warner and Simon [Ref. 7] attempted to determine the
effects of pay on both first and second term retention
decisions in the Navy. They used AVF-era data and the ACOL
model to examine the pay elasticities for 16 occupational
groups. They found that pay elasticities ranged from 1 . to
3.0 with those in "white-collar" ratings having the highest
elasticity and those in the more physically demanding
ratings having the lowest elasticities. They estimated that
a one-level increase in an SRB multiple would raise the
reenlistment rate by two to five percent. They also found
that the larger the first term bonus, the less likely a
person would be to reenlist at the second decision point,
where bonuses are smaller. This is due to the fact that
some of those who reenlisted at the first decision point did
so because the large bonus increased their pay such that it
outweighed their preference for civilian life. At the
second decision point their taste for civilian life either
did not change, or perhaps increased, while the bonus
decreased.
Cymrot [Ref. 8] used the ACOL approach to examine the
relationship between SRBs and enlisted retention in the
Marine Corps from 1979 through 1985. He grouped the Marine
Corps' 356 Military Occupational Specialty (MOSs) into 22
skill families based on the assumption that people in
similar occupations have similar responses to bonuses. Each
skill family was divided into three experience zones
corresponding to the SRB zones. His model estimated
reenlistment rates in the various skill families and zones
across the spectrum of bonus multiples from zero to five.
His method predicted reenlistment rates for all possible
bonus multiple levels in all skill families, even though
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some multiples were never paid in some skill families. This
allows planners to predict the effects of unprecedented
bonus levels. Other explanatory variables included in the
model were unemployment rate, net pay, and pay grade. He i^-~
found that in zone A (21 months to six years of service) , a
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
increases the predicted overall retention rate by 4.4
percentage points. Changes in zones B (six to ten years of
service) and C (ten to 14 years of service) were 1.9% and
.7% respectively. Net pay was defined as the difference
between potential military pay and civilian pay for a one
year period. Its effect was generally insignificant due in
large part to the problems involved with estimating both
military and civilian earnings. Cymrot hypothesized that
pay grade captures much of the real variation in military
pay. Those of higher pay grades were found to be more
likely to reenlist than those of lower grades. This is only
logical since pay grade is a measure of past success and
future prospects within the Marine Corps.
Cymrot also examined the model the Marine Corps is using
to allocate bonus funds. He found that the bivariate
approach which considers only reenlistment rate and bonus
level is currently being used. He pointed out several
instances where the simple bivariate model predicted that
increasing the bonus multiplier would decrease
reenlistments . This effect was caused, in part, by the use
11
of the bivariate model and, in part, by not considering the
bonus as part of an overall compensation package during a
period (FYs 1981 and 1982) when large increases in base pay
and allowances occurred.
C. STUDIES FOCUSING ON NONPECUNIARY INFLUENCES
Since it is generally acknowledged that there is more to
occupational decisions than just pay, many studies have
attempted to measure the effects of these other influences.
These effects are usually measured in addition to the
compensation effects in order to avoid omitted variable bias
in the estimates. Generally, opinion surveys are used to
measure the influence of these factors on reenlistment
behavior. While this approach generates self-reported data
with its inherent bias, it is the only practical method of
estimating these effects since these factors do not readily
lend themselves to experimentation.
Chow and Polich [Ref. 9] analyzed the reenlistment rates
of approximately 4,000 personnel surveyed in the 1976 DOD
Personnel Survey. These personnel were all within one year
of reenlistment and were from the three "other" services
(non Marine Corps) . The Marines were not included due to
missing data. They estimated the effects of RMC, bonuses,
in-kind allowances, and "negative" aspects of the military
service environment. They also considered several factors
that are less subject to control by the military, including
factors relating to civilian employment opportunities, and
12
individual attitudes toward military service. A unique
aspect of their study was that they constructed a measure of
RMC and compared it to the individuals' self reported
estimates. They were also able to test the relationship
between reenlistment intentions and actual behavior.
Their significant findings were:
<- Reenlistment intention closely correlates with actual
reenlistment. Of those who said they were going to
reenlist, 86% actually did, while only 5% of those who
said they were not going to reenlist actually did so.
Of those who said there was a greater than 90% chance of
their reenlisting, 89% actually did reenlist. The
correlation rates for the Navy were significantly higher
than for the other two services in the study.
- Higher reenlistment rates were found among those who had
higher bonus multiples, females and nonwhites, and among
personnel with dependents living in government housing.
- Reenlistment rates were lower among those who
underestimated the value of their compensation, those
who had completed high school or had been to college
when they entered the service, those whose test scores
indicated high mental ability, and among Air Force
personnel
.
- Family separation, frequent rotation and unusually long
hours of work did not significantly affect reenlistment.
-yPay elasticity was estimated to be 3.9, this means that
a ten percent increase in pay would result in a 39
percent increase the reenlistment rate. While even 100%
changes in the service environment factors increased the
estimated reenlistment rate by less than 5%.
- Changes in policy, such as educational programs or
payment in cash of all allowances, including tax
advantages, which would increase members' perception of
their compensation would increase reenlistment rates by
no more that 11%.
Warner and Goldberg [Ref. 10] estimated the relationship
between wage elasticity and what they consider to be the
major non-pecuniary element influencing reenlistment
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decisions of Navy enlisted personnel: sea duty. They used
the ACOL model with the additional variables of marital
status, length of service (LOS) , age, unemployment rate, and
a sea duty variable which
...was the proportion of personnel in each individual's
rating who were in sea duty in the next four LOS cells
following the individual's LOS cell at the time of his
decision. This proportion is a proxy for the individual's
expected proportion of time spent in sea duty during
another term of enlistment.
Their parameter estimate for the sea duty variable had a
highly significant, negative effect on reenlistment
.
However, its maximum effect at the sample mean value was
small. A 20% increase in sea duty is estimated to reduce
the reenlistment rate by only .016. Warner and Goldberg
estimate that this effect can easily be overcome by
additional sea pay and bonuses. For example, a 10% increase
in sea duty can be overcome by a 2% increase in pay.
Fletcher and Giesler [Ref. 11] examined Navy
reenlistment decisions compared to individual satisfaction
in three general areas. These areas were pay, quality of
job, and quality of military life. Quality of job factors
included autonomy, physical work environment, skill
utilization, team effort, and relationships with peers,
supervisors, and subordinates. Quality of military life
factors included deployment time, housing, duty station,
medical services, and ship habitability . They found that
satisfaction with pay and with job factors are positively
related to first term reenlistment, while the quality of
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military life factors show a marked positive effect on
career reenlistments. They also examined education and
mental group and found that these factors are not
consistently related to reenlistment probability.
They did not attempt to evaluate the size of the
relative effects between satisfaction with pay, quality of
job and quality of military life, but only sought to
determine which variables that were significant for first
and second term reenlistments. On the positive side for
cost containment, they hypothesized that the quality of job
factors which they report to be more important for first
term reenlistment "can usually be improved through effective
leadership and personnel management." [Ref ll:p. 10] Their
most significant finding was that reenlistment behavior can
be better predicted by organizational commitment than by
satisfaction with specific job aspects. They conclude by
stating that while quality of life elements significantly
affect reenlistment, the cost of improving member's
satisfaction with these elements remains to be determined.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined studies that have tested
theories of reenlistment behavior. While pay has generally
been considered the primary factor influencing the
reenlistment decision, nonpecuniary factors also have been
theorized as having considerable influence. The studies
which attempted to measure the effects of these nonpecuniary
15
factors found that those which were significant had only a
minor effect on reenlistment behavior. Even a variable
which is almost universally considered to be very important,
sea duty, showed only minor effects. Several possible
explanations occur, as discussed next.
Enlisted accessions come from a widely varied background
with many combinations of educational level, personal
values, economic class and motivations for joining. Some
join for job training, work experience and educational
benefits. Others join out of curiosity, a search for
adventure or to "find themselves." When the time comes for
the reenlistment decision, these factors combine with the
individual's service experiences and a "gut feeling" to stay
or leave emerges. A person could be totally satisfied with
all aspects of the military, including pay, and still not
reenlist because he does not visualize himself making a
career of the military. While this could be considered to
be just a strong taste for civilian life, this author
believes it goes deeper. It could be the desire to do
different things or to be consistent with one's original
plan to spend four years in the military and then get out.
Incentives such as the GI Bill or specific technical
training are worth more the sooner they are used. This is
due to the individual having a longer period of time
remaining in his life to reap the rewards of the training.
This could skew the results when measuring satisfaction with
16
military life because these individuals could be very
satisfied with military life but value the use of their
training or benefits more.
The studies measuring nonpecuniary variables looked at a
cross section of military members. Cymrot showed that pay
has different effects when measured across different skill
groupings. It is therefore likely that nonpecuniary
variables would show different effects across these same
skill groupings.
None of the studies attempted to measure individual
attitudes concerning the military's ultimate reason for
existence: combat. While they all recognize that military
life is different from civilian life, they fail to focus on
attitudes towards actual participation in combat. An
individual's assessment of this risk factor can be a major
factor in his reenlistment decision. It can also be a
positive or negative influence. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that there are Marines whose primary reason for
being in the service is the potential opportunity to
experience combat either for the first time or again. The
only possible brushing of this area was by Fletcher and
Giesler's finding that "reenlistment can be better predicted
by organizational commitment than by satisfaction with
specific job aspects." Organizational commitment is related
to a person's belief in the purpose and goals of the
organization. Besides the combat aspect, the military
17
offers unique opportunities in other areas as well. Cook
put it best: "being able to play with some of the world's
most expensive and exotic toys. . .travel ... camaraderie. .. and
responsibility. . .are important." [Ref. 4:p. 11]
Overall the author believes that nonpecuniary variables
are more important in individual decisions than previous
studies show. The attempts to measure the effects of these
variables across the total spectrum of military personnel
has diluted the effects. Individuals in more technically
skilled occupational fields and/or lower risk occupational
fields may have a value non-pecuniary variables differently
than those in lesser skilled and/or higher risk occupational
fields. By pooling their responses, the extremes may cancel
each other out. The following chapters will attempt to
measure the varying effects of some of these variables in
differing occupational fields.
18
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. DATA 1
The data used in this study was the 1985 Department of
Defense Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel , which
surveyed 124,590 military personnel. The survey was
conducted by mail during the first half of calendar year
1985. The population from which the survey was drawn
consisted of all active-duty officers and enlisted personnel
who were on active duty on 30 September 1984, with the
exception of new enlisted accessions with fewer than four
months of service. The population was stratified by
service, length of service, and sex and random samples were
drawn from each group. Officers, females, and Marine Corps
personnel were sampled at a higher rate in order to permit
more detailed analyses of these groups. Since this thesis
deals only with Marine enlisted personnel, further
references to the survey will deal only with those
personnel
.
The sample consisted of 20,053 randomly selected
enlisted Marines of which 1230 (6.1%) had separated at the
time the questionnaire was distributed and did not complete
the survey. This biases the data somewhat as those
-'-The following section quotes broadly from the Defense
Manpower Data Center's 1985 DOD Survey of Officer and
Enlisted Personnel User's Manual and Codebook.
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remaining in the sample have a greater propensity to stay in
the service. However, the size of the sample and further
restriction of the data (limiting the sample to those with
two years or less remaining on their enlistment) should
reduce its effect to near zero. Of the 18,823 samples which
were mailed, 13,898 (73.8%) were returned. Even though this
is a high response rate for this type of study [Ref. 13: pp.
2-9], it does introduce bias into the data unless it can be
determined that the those who did respond still represent a
random sample. No such analysis was reported in Reference
13.
The questionnaires were designed to measure attitudes
and opinions in two broad areas: first, those specifically
concerned with family issues and, second, those concerned
with broader issues of personnel management. The final
survey consisted of nine sections which collected factual
and opinion data on the following subjects: Military
Information, Present and Past Locations, Reenlistment/Career
Intent, Individual and Family Characteristics, Dependents,
Military Compensation, Benefits and Programs, Civilian Labor
Force Experience, Family Resources, and Military Life.
For this thesis the survey data was matched by DMDC with
information from the Active Duty Military Master and Loss
File in order to obtain actual reenlistment behavior. The
variable used to determine this behavior was Reenlistment
Eligibility. This information enabled the data to be
20
restricted to those members who had voluntarily separated
and were eligible for reenlistment without a waiver, plus
those who reenlisted.
The data were further restricted for this thesis to
members between two and twelve years of service. Members
with greater than 12 years have a retention rate in excess
of 90 percent due to the proximity of retirement as well as
the self-selection effects at previous reenlistment points.
Those with fewer than two years were excluded to eliminate
the effects of hastily formed opinions. The sample was also
restricted to pay grades E-3 through E-6; those with two
years or fewer remaining on their enlistment; and those on
their first or second enlistment.
The final sample size was 2838, which was further
divided into data sets consisting of those serving their
first enlistment and those serving their second enlistment.
Each of the enlistment data sets was further divided into
two data sets named the Combat Arms data set, and
Administrative, Maintenance and Logistics (AML) data set.
The Combat Arms data set consisted of Marines in
infantry, artillery and armor occupational fields as well as
two fields, communications operations, and motor transport,
which have a large portion of their members serving in
combat arms units. The AML data set consisted of all other
Marines in the survey. Further division of the data sets
into combat support and aviation sets was attempted but
21




This thesis attempts to measure the effects of
individual attitudes towards several aspects of military
life on the probability that an individual will reenlist.
It is an attempt to update the 1980 Chow and Polich study
and apply it to the Marine Corps. Changes in critical
questions, notably the absence in the 1985 survey of the
question referring to the individual's estimate of Regular
Military Compensation (RMC)
,
prevented a close approximation
of the Chow and Polich study. Therefore, while the general
structure of attempting to measure the influence of
nonpecuniary variables on reenlistment behavior is similar,
the actual variables used are not comparable due to
significant changes in the survey's questions. None of the
non-pecuniary, survey variables used by Chow and Polich are
duplicated in this study. Three demographic variables, FEM,
RACE, and COLLEGE are duplicated in this study.
This thesis also measures the validity of using
intention to reenlist when studying Marine Corps
reenlistment behavior. Chow and Polich did not include
Marine Corps data in their study.
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1 . Independent Variables
a. Opinion Variables
Five variables were used to measure the
influence of an individual Marine's attitudes towards
various aspects of military life. These variables are
discussed below.
(1) PAY . This variable measures a Marine's
dissatisfaction with his pay. It is formed from the
response to question O109105E which ranks satisfaction with
pay and allowances on a scale from one (very satisfied) to
five (very dissatisfied) . It is used as a continuous
variable. This variable is used rather than actual pay on
the theory that relative satisfaction with pay is more
important than the actual amount. Evidence of this effect
is found in studies by Hulin [Ref. 14:pp. 122-126] and Kraut
[Ref. 15:pp. 233-243]. The expected effect of this variable
is that the more dissatisfied a Marine with pay and
allowances, the more likely he is to leave, ceteris paribus .
(2) CIVJOB . This variable measures a Marine's
self reported probability of finding a good civilian job if
he were to leave the Marine Corps at the time the survey was
answered. It is formed from the response to question
096E92, which ranks the probability of finding a good
civilian job from zero in ten (no chance) to ten in ten
(certain) . It is used as a continuous variable. It is used
as an attitudinal proxy for the civilian/military pay
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comparison in the ACOL model. Also, those who are more
certain of finding a good job may have already investigated
their prospects in anticipation of leaving the Marines. The
expected effect of this variable is that the more certain a
person is that he will find a good civilian job, the more
likely he is to leave, ceteris paribus .
(3) EXPECT . This variable measures a Marine's
attitude toward how well life in the Marine Corps has met
his expectations. It is formed from the response to
question O10S104A which ranks agreement with the statement:
"Life in the military is about what I expected it to be" on
a scale from one (strongly agree) to five (strongly
disagree). It is used as a continuous variable. It is used
on the theory that when a person enlists in the Marine
Corps, he has certain pre-conceived expectations about
military life. How well or poorly the Marine Corps meets
these expectations has a considerable effect on a person's
satisfaction with the organization. Royle and Robertson
[Ref. 16:p. 27] found satisfaction with the organization as
a whole was an important predictor for retention. Also,
this variable attempts to measure the effects of Fletcher
and Giesler's [Ref. ll:p. 16] finding that quality of
military life factors show a marked increased effect on
career reenlistments. This variable was used instead of
question 0110E106 which measured satisfaction with the
military as a way of life because 0110E106 was found to be
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too highly correlated with reenlistment behavior, having
almost an identity relationship. The expected effect of
this variable is that the more the Marine Corps failed to
meet a person's expectations, the more likely he is to
leave, ceteris paribus .
(4) FAMENV. This variable measured a Marine's
dissatisfaction with the military way of life as it relates
to family environment. It is formed from the response to
guestion O109105F which ranks satisfaction with family
environment on a scale from one (very satisfied) to five
(very dissatisfied). It is used as a continuous variable.
It is included as a summary variable to test Fletcher and
Giesler's findings that several factors which affect the
family environment impact on retention. [Ref. ll:p. 16]
Also, with the high and increasing number of married
enlisted Marines it is important to know how much emphasis
they put on family environment as a reenlistment
consideration. The expected effect of this variable is that
the more dissatisfied a Marine is with the military way of
life as it relates to family environment, the more likely,
he is to leave, ceteris paribus .
(5) JOBSAT . This variable measured a Marine's
dissatisfaction with his current job. It was formed from
the response to guestion O109105J which measured
satisfaction on a scale from one (very satisfied) to five
(very dissatisfied)
. It is used as a continuous variable.
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Its inclusion attempts to measure Fletcher and Giesler's
[Ref. ll:p. 16] finding that satisfaction with job factors
are positively related to reenlistment . The expected effect
of this variable is that the more dissatisfied a Marine is
with his current job, the more likely he is to leave,
ceteris paribus .
b. Demographic Variables
Seven demographic variables are included. These
are described below.
(1) CHILD . This is used as a continuous
variable which measures the effect of each additional child
on the probability of reenlistment. The impact of this
variable is hypothesized to be ambiguous as one individual
may decide to reenlist for the job security when faced with
another child to raise, while another individual may get out
to seek a better job or family environment.
(2) FEM . FEM is a dummy variable which has the
value of one if the Marine is female and zero otherwise.
The expected effect of this variable is hypothesized to be
ambiguous. Chow and Polich [Ref. 9] found women more likely
to reenlist. However, the greater number of women in the
armed services today over the time of their study may have
caused female behavior to more closely approximate that of
men. On the one hand, women would be less likely to leave,
ceteris paribus , due to the fact that they get equal pay and
equal opportunity in the military without having to serve in
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the most arduous and risky occupations. On the other hand,
the call to motherhood, coupled with family separations
inherent in a Marine Corps career would make some women more
likely to leave.
(3) RACE . RACE is a dummy variable which has
the value of one if the Marine is black or hispanic, and
zero otherwise. The expected effect of this variable is
that minorities would be less likely to leave, ceteris
paribus , due to the equal pay and equal opportunity afforded
by the military.
(4) COLLEGE . COLLEGE is a dummy variable which
has a value of one if the Marine has completed one or more
years of college, and zero otherwise. The expected effect
of this variable is that those Marines with higher education
abilities and aspirations will be more likely to leave,
ceteris paribus .
(5) MAR . MAR is a dummy variable which has a
value of one if the MARine is married, and zero otherwise.
The expected effect of this variable is that those Marines
who are married will be less likely to leave, ceteris
paribus . This may be due to their having a working spouse
which will increase the family income or that they may
highly value the security that a steady paycheck brings.
(6) RANK . RANK is a continuous variable which
has the value of the individual's pay grade (i.e., E-3 = 3).
The expected effect of this variable is that the higher an
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individual's rank, the less likely he is to leave, ceteris
paribus . This variable accounts for the propensity of a
person who does well in a job to continue in it. Higher
rank is the military's way of telling a person he is doing
well.
(7) TIS . TIS is a continuous variable which is
formed by adding the total months on active duty at the time
the survey was answered to the average months remaining on
the current enlistment. (Average months remaining on the
current enlistment was calculated by averaging the high and
low limits of the answers to guestion E9, i.e., if the
individual answered that he had "3 to 6 months" remaining,
4.5 was added to his months in service.) This calculation
approximately egualized the time in service at the
reenlistment point for all observations. The expected
effect of this variable is that the longer a person serves,
the longer he is likely to serve, ceteris paribus . This is
due not only to the self selection effect that those who
like their job tend to stay in it longer but also that the
longer one stays in the military, the higher the present
value of retirement becomes.
2 . Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, LEAVE, is a dichotomous
variable formed from the reenlistment code variable. All
observations with codes other than "1A" and zero were
deleted so that the sample consisted only of Marines who
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were eligible and recommended for immediate reenlistment
.
This ensured that all those who left the service did so
voluntarily. Those with a code of "1A" were assigned a
value of one meaning that they did not reenlist. Those with
a value of zero as a reenlistment code were given a value of
zero meaning that they had reenlisted. Since more than two
years had elapsed between completion of the survey and
compilation of this data base, every Marine in the sample
had made a reenlistment decision. This thesis does not
consider extension of enlistment as a separate outcome due
to anecdotal evidence that most extensions are effected in
order to qualify for a higher bonus, or some other benefit
later. Therefore, an extension is considered to be a
reenlistment.
The following is a list of the explanatory variables























3 . Analysis Method
The data were analyzed using the SAS LOGIST
procedure on the IBM 370 Model 3033 computer at the Naval
Postgraduate School. This procedure uses the maximum
likelihood method to calculate the probability that an
individual observation will exhibit the behavior under
examined. The estimating equation is of the following
form:
In [P/(l-P) ] = Oq + I Si x i
where
P = the probability of not reenlisting,
In [P/(l-P)] = the log-odds of not reenlisting,
Xj_ = the explanatory variables, and
6
j_
= the parameters to be estimated.





The segmenting of the data described in Chapter III
produced seven data sets which are named: Combined, First
Enlistment Combined, First Enlistment Combat Arms, First
Enlistment AML, Second Enlistment Combined, Second
Enlistment Combat Arms, and Second Enlistment AML. The
results of estimating the model for all seven data sets are
presented in Tables 1-7. All seven estimates were
significant at the .01 level using the likelihood ratio to
test goodness of fit. The model chi-squares for each data
set are presented in the tables.
The maximum effect of each variable was evaluated by
selecting an observation with a calculated probability as
close to . 5 as possible for each data set. The value of .5
was used as the most likely point where an individual's
evaluation of his decision variables will be critical.
Values above .5, in this case, will lead to leaving the
Marine Corps. Using a spreadsheet and the formula
P-l = 1/(1 + e~ z ) the actual value of each variable for the
chosen observation was then increased or decreased by one
unit as appropriate and the change in the predicted
probability was then observed. Since most of the variables
were dummy variables, or had values from one to five (11 in
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the case of CIVJOB) , and TIS had values ranging from 28.5 to
137, a ten percent change was made in the value of TIS to
equalize its effect across its range.
A classification table was calculated for each data set
and is printed in Tables 1-7. One method of evaluating how
well the model predicts is to calculate how much better it
predicts than a model which knows nothing about the
individuals and merely classifies them as being in the part
of the group with the higher number of members. For
example, it can be seen from Table 1 that 57 percent of the
observations left the Marine Corps (were true positives)
.
If the model classified everyone in the group as positive,
it would be correct 57 percent of the time. This is known
as the "naive" method and its value is printed on each
classification table. Other methods of evaluating the
classification power of the model are:
- Sensitivity—calculates the percentage of true
positives which were predicted to be true,
- Specif icity--calculates the percentage of true
negatives which were predicted to be negative,
- False positive rate—calculates the percentage of
predicted positives which were true negatives,
- False negative rate—calculates the percentage of
predicted negatives which were true positives.
Using the naive method, the model predicted well on the
combined data set, and on the second enlistment data sets.
However, it barely exceeded the naive method for the First
Enlistment data sets. Also, on the First Enlistment data
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sets, the model predicted a very high percentage of Marines
would get out who actually stayed. The specificity was only
17 percent for the First Enlistment, Combined data set. For
the Second Enlistment data sets, the reverse was true, the
model predicted that many more Marines would stay in than
did. The probable reason for this disparity was that the
model did not control for reenlistment bonuses. The
behavior of first term enlisted Marines has been shown to be
positively influenced by a bonus. The absence of a bonus
for most second term Marines could be responsible for the
model's prediction that more Marines would stay than
actually did. This is_jconsistent with the finding by Warner
and Simon [Ref. 7] that the larger the first term bonus, the
less likely a person would be to reenlist at the second
decision point.
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Independent variables are discussed in order of
significance from most significant to least significant. 1
Each parameter estimate, when significant, had the
hypothesized sign except where noted. A summary of these
results are presented in Table 8
.
JOBSAT was significant at the one percent level for five
of the seven data sets, at the five percent level for one
^Maximum effects will be reported for some non-
significant variables for the sake of comparison. No other
importance should be attached to them.
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data set and at the ten percent level for the other. Its
maximum effect in the Combined data set was five percent.
Its highest maximum effect was seven percent in the First
Enlistment, Combat Arms group. This means that for every
one level increase in dissatisfaction a Marine reported that
he is with his job, he is about five percent more likely to
leave when his enlistment is over, ceteris paribus .
RACE was also significant at the one percent level for
five of the seven data sets, at the five percent level for
one and insignificant for one. In the Combined data set it
had the highest maximum effect of all the variables at ten
percent. That is, the probability that a Marine will
reenlist is ten percent higher if he is a minority, ceteris
paribus . In the Second Enlistment, Combat Arms data set its
maximum effect was 22 percent.
CIVJOB was also significant at the one percent level for
five of the data sets, at the five percent level for one,
and insignificant for one. Its maximum effect in the
Combined data set was three percent. That is, for every ten
percent more probable a Marine is of finding a good civilian
job, he is three percent more likely to leave, ceteris
paribus . Its highest maximum effect in any data set was
also three percent in both AML sets.
RANK was significant at the one percent level in four
data sets, at the ten percent level in one and insignificant
in two. Its maximum effect in the Combined data set was
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nine percent. That is, for every rank higher in grade a
Marine is, he is nine percent more likely to reenlist,
ceteris paribus . The highest maximum effect was in the
Second Enlistment, AML data set at 15 percent.
MAR was significant at the one percent level for three
data sets and insignificant for the other four. Its maximum
effect in the Combined data set was eight percent. That
means that a Marine who is married is about eight percent
more likely to reenlist than an unmarried MARine, ceteris
paribus . The highest maximum effect was in the First
Enlistment, AML group at 17 percent.
CHILD was significant at the one percent level for two
data sets, at the five percent for one and insignificant for
four data sets. Its maximum effect in the combined set was
three percent, but it was insignificant in that data set.
It was significant in both combat arms sets, at the five
percent level for first enlistment and one percent level for
second enlistment. While its effect was hypothesized to be
ambiguous, in data sets where it was significant, its
parameter estimate was negative. In the First Enlistment,
Combat Arms data set, a Marine is 12 percent more likely to
reenlist for each child he has ceteris paribus .
TIS was significant at the one percent level in one set,
at the five percent level in one, at the ten percent level
in two and insignificant in three data sets. Its maximum
effect in the Combined data set was also its highest maximum
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effect at two percent. That is, for every ten percent more
months in service a Marine has, he is two percent more
likely to reenlist, ceteris paribus .
PAY was significant in three data sets and insignificant
in five. Its maximum effect in the Combined data set was
two percent. Its highest maximum effect was five percent in
the Second Enlistment, Combat Arms data set. That is, for
every one level increase in dissatisfaction with pay a
Marine is two percent less likely to reenlist, ceteris
paribus .
COLLEGE was significant at the one percent level in one
data set, at the ten percent level in one, and insignificant
in five. Its maximum effect in a data set where it was
significant was five percent in the Combined data set. That
is, Marines who report completion of at least one year of
college are five percent less likely to reenlist, ceteris
paribus .
FAMENV was significant at the ten percent level in two
data sets. Its maximum effect in the Combined data set was
three percent. That is for every one level increase in
dissatisfaction with the military as a family environment, a
Marine is three percent less likely to reenlist, ceteris
paribus .
FEM was significant at the ten percent level in one data
set. Its maximum effect was five percent in the Combined
data set. That is, women Marines are five percent more
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likely to reenlist than men, ceteris paribus . Its effect
was hypothesized to be ambiguous and its insignificance
tends to support that hypothesis.
EXPECT was significant at the ten percent level in one
data set. Its maximum effect in that data set was two
percent. That is, for every one level increase in
disagreement with the statement "Life in the military is
about what I expected it to be," a Marine is two percent
more likely to get out, ceteris paribus .
C. DATA SETS
The regression results from the different data sets were
compared in order to determine if there were any differences
in reenlistment behavior among Marines in the various
occupational fields and enlistment groups. This comparison
was done in two ways. First, the Combined, AML, and Combat
Arms data sets for those at the first reenlistment point
were compared to their respective counterparts at the second
reenlistment point. This allowed identification of any
reenlistment behavior differences between those at the first
and second reenlistment points. Second, the AML and Combat
Arms groups were compared to each other at each enlistment
point. This allowed identification of any reenlistment
behavior differences across occupational groups. The
significance level selected for these comparisons was the
five percent level. The results of these comparisons
follow.
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1 . Combined First Enlistment versus Combined Second
Enlistment
PAY, CHILD and RANK were significant at the second
reenlistment point but not at the first reenlistment point.
First termers reenlist for reasons other than satisfaction
with pay. The further along in a career a Marine is, the
greater the impact satisfaction with pay has on reenlistment
behavior. The increased importance of children on second
term reenlistment is probably due to the fact that the
average number of children for the first term group was .23
while the average for the second term group was .90 or
almost four times as many. The difference in the importance
of RANK is probably due to two factors. First, the average
rank of the first term group was less than E-4 , while the
average rank of the second term group was almost E-5. The
higher a Marine's rank, the more he has committed himself to
the Marine Corps. Second, the longer a Marine serves, the
higher rank he must be in order to be eligible to reenlist.
E-3's and most E-4's would not be allowed to reenlist at the
second reenlistment point. The only variable which was
significant for the first termers but not for the second
termers was MAR. This effect is probably due to the
difference in the number of married Marines in each group,
34 percent at the first reenlistment point and 67 percent at
the second reenlistment point. MAR was the variable with
the largest maximum effect in the first term while RANK had
the largest maximum effect in the second term.
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2 . AML First Enlistment versus AML Second Enlistment
In this comparison, JOBSAT and RANK were significant
for the second termers but not for the first termers, while
MAR again was significant for the first termers but not for
second termers. MAR again had the largest maximum effect
for the first termers while rank had the largest maximum
effect for the second termers.
3
.
Combat Arms First Enlistment versus Combat Arms
Second Enlistment
In this comparison, RACE and RANK were significant
for the second termers but not for the first termers, while
CIVJOB was significant for the first termers but not for the
second termers. The variable with the highest maximum
effect for the first termers was CHILD, while RACE had the
highest maximum effect for the second termers.
4 AML First Enlistment versus Combat Arms First
Enlistment
In this comparison, RACE and MAR were significant in
AML but not in Combat Arms, while CHILD and JOBSAT were
significant in Combat Arms but not in AML. The mean values
of each variable were virtually the same in each group. The
highest significant maximum effect in the AML group was RACE
at 17 percent, while CHILD had the largest significant
effect in the Combat Arms group at 12 percent.
5 AML Second Enlistment versus Combat Arms Second
Enlistment
CIVJOB was the only variable which was significant
in the AML group but not in the Combat Arms group. This is
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probably due to the AML group containing all the technical
occupations which are much more in demand in the civilian
economy than are combat arms trained Marines. The reason
this shows up at the second enlistment point but not at the
first enlistment point is that first termers in Combat Arms
specialties have not yet had a chance to self-select
themselves out of that occupational field. At the second
reenlistment decision point, those Marines still in Combat
Arms do not have many skills which are attractive to the
civilian job market. PAY and CHILD are the only variables
significant in the Combat Arms group which are not
significant in the AML group. The significant variable with
the highest maximum effect in the AML group was RANK at 15
percent while in the Combat Arms group it was RACE at 22
percent.
D. REENLISTMENT INTENTION VS. REENLISTMENT BEHAVIOR
This data set provided the opportunity to test the
validity of using an individual's reported intention to
reenlist as a predictor of reenlistment behavior. Chow and
Polich [Ref. 8] tested this relationship for Army, Navy, and
Air Force personnel. They reported that an individual's
self-reported probability of reenlistment correlated closely
with his actual behavior and concluded that, in the absence
of actual reenlistment behavior, "survey intentions can be
used as accurate predictors of reenlistment behavior...."
[Ref. 8:p. 11]. They measured this correlation for those
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personnel within one year of their expiration of term of
service (ETS)
.
This thesis tested the correlation between intentions
and actual behavior for those within two years of ETS as
well as within one year of ETS. The results are shown at
Table 9. At first glance, the intention numbers do not seem
to correlate highly with actual behavior. Of those who
reported that they were certain to reenlist only 74.1
percent of the two year group and 77.8 percent of the one
year group actually reenlisted. Of those who reported that
there was "no chance" that they would reenlist, 13.3 percent
of the two year group and 11.0 percent of the one year group
actually reenlisted. Combining these categories shows that
in the one year group 68 of 732 Marines or 9 . 3 percent
exhibited behavior completely contrary to their intention.
This appears to be too high a percentage of error when we
are trying to measure the impact of variables at the five
percent level, unless the errant behavior is randomly
distributed. To test this possibility, the author reran the
logistic regression on the combined data set using a new
dependent variable. The new variable was constructed from
the intention variable and categorized those who reported
their probability of reenlistment as . 5 or greater as
stayers and those less than .5 as leavers. A comparison of
the results of the regressions using the actual and
intention dependent variables are shown in Table 10.
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The number of stayers and leavers varies by only 55, or
less than two percent of the sample population, between the
two different methods. This indicates that categorizing
individuals by their intentions is highly reliable, even out
to two years before their ETS . The parameter estimates are
very similar with only three variables, CHILD, EXPECT and
FEM, showing large changes in significance. The maximum
effects were also very similar with only FEM, EXPECT and
RANK changing more than two percent. Changes of two percent
or less in maximum effect can be due to rounding. These
results indicate that categorizing individuals by their
intentions is highly reliable, even out to two years before
their ETS.
It is interesting to note that while the reenlistment
intentions of women showed no difference from those of men,
their actual behavior was significantly different, although
only at the eight percent level. Women were five percent


























































































663 | 543 | 1206
I I
379 | 1253 | 1632
1042 | 1796 2838
SENSITIVITY: 76.8% SPECIFICITY: 55.0% CORRECT: 67.
5
:










VARIABLE BETA STD. ERR CHI-SO SIGNIF MAX EFFECT
INTERCEPT 0.355 0.512 0.48 0.49
PAY 0.039 0.064 0.36 0.55 .02
CIVJOB 0. 110 0.024 20.27 0.01 *** .01
CHILD -0.068 0.114 0.35 0.56 .07
FEM -0.313 0.208 2.25 0.13 .07
EXPECT 0.103 0.063 2.67 0. 10 * .02
FAMENV 0.126 0.073 2.94 0.09 * .03
JOBSAT 0.195 0.055 12.44 0.01 *** .05
RACE -0.380 0. 143 7.03 0.01 *** . 10
COLLEGE 0.140 0.167 0.71 0.40 .03
MAR -0.559 0.139 16.03 0.00 *** . 13
RANK -0. 194 0.101 3.61 0.06 * .05
TIS -0.015 0. 006 4.74 0.03 *** .01 #
MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 132.38 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
* SIGNIFICANT AT 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT AT 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
*** SIGNIFICANT AT 99% CONFIDENCE LEVEL














TOTAL 131 | 1293 1424
SENSITIVITY: 94.1% SPECIFICITY: 17.0% CORRECT: 71.2%






VARIABLE BETA STD ERR CHI-SO SIGNIF MAX EFFECT
INTERCEPT 1.615 0.588 7.55 0.01
PAY 0.126 0.059 4.56 0.03 * * .04
CIVJOB 0.055 0.023 5.94 0.01 *** .01
CHILD -0.169 0.063 7.16 0.01 *** .04
FEM -0. 122 0.165 0.55 0.46 .03
EXPECT 0.029 0.061 0.23 0.63 .01
FAMENV 0.078 0.062 1.54 0.21 .02
JOBSAT 0.215 0.050 18.85 0.01 *** .06
RACE -0.486 0.124 15.24 0.01 *** . 12
COLLEGE 0.240 0.141 2.91 0.09 * .06
MAR -0.088 0.133 0.44 0.51 . 03
RANK -0.554 0. 110 25.45 0.01 *** .13
TIS -0.005 0.005 1.26 0.01 *** .01 #
MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 134.43 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
* SIGNIFICANT AT 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT AT 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
*** SIGNIFICANT AT 99% CONFIDENCE LEVEL





NEGATIVE 599 184 783
POSITIVE 330 301 631
TOTAL 929 485 1414
SENSITIVITY: 47.7% SPECIFICITY: 76.5% CORRECT: 63. 6-








VARIABLE BETA STD ERR CHI-SO SIGNIF MAX EFFECT
INTERCEPT 0. 124 0.651 0.04 0.85
PAY 0.131 0.081 2.59 0.11 .04
CIVJOB 0.104 0.033 9.91 0.01 *** .03
CHILD 0.115 0.139 0.68 0.41 .03
FEM -0.286 0.232 1.52 0.22 .07
EXPECT 0. 130 0.081 2.55 0. 11 .04
FAMENV 0. 113 0.094 1.45 0.23 .03
JOBSAT 0. 132 0.071 3 .44 0.06 * .04
RACE -0.547 0.185 8.68 0.01 *** . 13
COLLEGE 0.105 0. 193 0.30 0.58 .02
MAR -0.704 0. 179 15.43 0.01 *** .17
RANK -0.153 0. 131 1.36 0.24 .13
TIS -0.015 0.008 3.03 0.08 * .01 #
MODEL CHI-SQUARE 85.26 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
* SIGNIFICANT AT 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT AT 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
*** SIGNIFICANT AT 99% CONFIDENCE LEVEL













TOTAL 97 759 856
SENSITIVITY: 92.9% SPECIFICITY: 20.6% CORRECT: 70.3%
FALSE POSITIVE RATE: 27.9% FALSE NEGATIVE RATE: 43.3%





VARIABLE BETA STD ERR CHI-SO SIGNIF MAX EFFECT
INTERCEPT 1.528 0.710 4.63
PAY 0.091 0.072 1.61 0.20 .02
CIVJOB 0.054 0.027 3.92 0.05 ** .01
CHILD -0.088 0.072 1.48 0.22 .03
FEM -0.057 0.176 0.10 0.75 .02
EXPECT 0.084 0.072 1.38 0.24 .02
FAMENV 0.046 0.075 0.38 0.54 .01
JOBSAT 0.232 0.059 15.54 0.01 *** .05
RACE -0.306 0. 147 4.29 0.04 ** .08
COLLEGE 0.193 0.154 1.56 0.21 .05
MAR -0.066 0.154 0. 19 0.67 .02
RANK -0.604 0.137 19.44 0.01 * * * . 15
TIS -0.003 0.006 0.27 0.61 .01 #
MODEL CHI-S<2UARE = 80.34 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
* SIGNIFICANT AT 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT AT 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
*** SIGNIFICANT AT 99% CONFIDENCE LEVEL













TOTAL 701 318 1019
SENSITIVITY: 43.6% SPECIFICITY: 78.5% CORRECT: 63.2%






VARIABLE BETA STD ERR CHI-SO SIGNIF MAX EFFECT
INTERCEPT 0.436 0.866 0.25 0.61
PAY -0. 143 0.111 1.66 0.20 .04
CIVJOB 0.126 0.037 11.44 0.01 *** .03
CHILD -0.466 0.207 5.06 0.02 * * .12
FEM -0.228 0.527 0. 19 0.66 .05
EXPECT 0.089 0.102 0.76 0.38 .03
FAMENV 0.142 0.120 1.40 0.24 .04
JOBSAT 0.300 0.092 10.59 0.01 *** .07
RACE -0. 164 0.234 0.49 0.48 .04
COLLEGE 0.373 0.363 1.06 0.30 .09
MAR -0.344 0.230 2.23 0.14 .08
RANK -0.194 0.167 1.35 0.25 .04
TIS -0.014 0.010 1.78 0.18 .01 #
MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 58.52 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
* SIGNIFICANT AT 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT AT 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
*** SIGNIFICANT AT 99% CONFIDENCE LEVEL













TOTAL 52 516 568
SENSITIVITY: 94.9% SPECIFICITY: 19.9% CORRECT: 74.3%






VARIABLE BETA STD ERR CHI-SO SIGNIF MAX EFFECT
INTERCEPT 2.050 1.160 3.12 0.08
PAY 0.219 0.111 3.90 0.05 ** .05
CIVJOB 0.056 0.041 1.87 0.17 .01
CHILD -0.407 0.139 8.59 0.01 *** .10
FEM -0.685 0.561 1.49 0.22 .17
EXPECT -0.121 0.118 1.04 0.31 .03
FAMENV 0.148 0.117 1.58 0.21 .04
JOBSAT 0.170 0.096 3.15 0.04 ** .04
RACE -0.934 0.238 15.37 0.01 *** .22
COLLEGE 0.587 0. 373 2.47 0.12 . 14
MAR 0.032 0.277 0.01 0.91 .01
RANK -0.488 0.199 6.01 0.01 *** .12
TIS -0.010 0.009 1.25 0.26 .02 #
MODEL CHI-SQUARE - 71.13 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
* SIGNIFICANT AT 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT AT 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
*** SIGNIFICANT AT 99% CONFIDENCE LEVEL





NEGATIVE 147 64 211
POSITIVE 68 116 184
TOTAL 215 180 395
SENSITIVITY: 63.0% SPECIFICITY: 69.7% CORRECT: 66. 9'







NUMBER OF DATA SETS AT
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL HIGHEST SIGNIFICANT
VARIABLE 1% 5% 10% MAXIMUM EFFECT
JOBSAT 5 1 1 7%
RACE 5 1 22%
CIVJOB 5 1 3%
RANK 4 2 15%
MAR 3 17%
CHILD 2 1 12%
TIS 1 1 2 2%
PAY 3 5%





REENLISTMENT RATES BY SURVEY REENLISTMENT INTENTION
FIRST ENLISTMENT

















ACTUAL REENLISTMENT BEHAVIOR VS REENLISTMENT INTENTION
ACTUAL INTENTION
MAX MAX
VARIABLE BETA SIGNI EFFECT BETA SIGNIF
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EFFECT
INTERCEPT 0.865 .01 -0.306
PAY 0.092 .03 ** .02 0.114 .01 *** .03
CIVJOB 0.076 .01 *** .02 0.107 .01 *** .03
CHILD -0.051 .27 .03 -0.205 .01 *** .05
FEM -0.216 .08 * .05 0.024 .86 .01
EXPECT 0.061 .12 .01 0.304 .01 *** .08
FAMENV 0.080 .06 * .03 0.116 .02 *** .03
JOBSAT 0.204 .01 *** .05 0.268 .01 *** .07
RACE 0.440 .01 *** . 10 -0.420 .01 *** . 10
COLLEGE 0.254 .01 *** .05 0.231 .04 * * .06
MAR 0.364 .01 *** .08 -0.369 .01 *** .09
RANK -0.389 .01 *** .09 -0.239 .01 *** .05
TIS -0.011 .01 *** .02 # -0.014 .01 *** .03 #
MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 645.92 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM (INTENTION)
MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 442.64 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM (ACTUAL)
* SIGNIFICANT AT 90% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
** SIGNIFICANT AT 95% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
*** SIGNIFICANT AT 99% CONFIDENCE LEVEL
# MAXIMUM EFFECT FOR 10% CHANGE IN TIS
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
The analysis conducted for this thesis generally
confirms previous findings and theories on the significance
of a variety of variables. Job satisfaction was found to be
the most significant variable affecting reenlistment
behavior. While the direct effects of pay differentials
between military and civilian pay were not measured, the
combination of the variables RANK, PAY and CIVJOB confirm
the findings of previous studies on the importance of higher
pay and promotion to reenlistment behavior. Being in a
minority racial group and being married continue to be
positively related to the reenlistment rate. The greatest
difference between this study and previous work is the
insignificance of sex on reenlistment behavior. Although
not including Marines, the Chow and Polich study found that
sex had a greater effect on reenlistment behavior than did
race. In particular, women were much more likely to
reenlist than were men. This thesis found sex to be
significant only in the Combined data set and only at the
eight percent level of significance. This difference is
probably due to the increased number of women in the armed
services between the 1976 and 1985 surveys and also the
increased number of occupational fields open to women. In
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short, as the differences between the career opportunities
of men and women shrink, their reenlistment behavior
differences will also shrink.
B. IMPLICATIONS
The significance of job satisfaction in the reenlistment
decision provides clear guidance to the Marine Corps.
Emphasis must be placed on ensuring that job opportunities
are both challenging and rewarding. This will be a
leadership challenge in future years of budget cuts if the
Marine Corps wishes to retain its best people.
The importance of children in the retention of Marines
in combat arms specialties may pose a challenge to Fleet
Marine Force organizations in their ability to deal with
personal problems which can arise from family
responsibilities. Current policy permits single parents to
remain on active duty. While these parents are required to
have dependent care arranged for short-notice deployments,
28.4 percent of the Marines in this data set who are single
parents reported in the survey that their arrangements are
not realistically workable. Another 15.8 percent reported
that their arrangements are "probably" realistically
workable. Since either of these two responses means that
the respondent has previously lied to the Marine Corps,
these percentages are probably lower than the actual
percentages of Marines who do not have adequate dependent
care arrangements.
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The lack of significance of sex on retention may affect
future planning. Current plans call for increased use of
women in the Marine Corps. Historically, they have been
easier to recruit and retain than men. If the results of
this study predict future trends, women may become harder
for the Marine Corps to attract and retain. As more
opportunities open for women in civilian jobs, the equal
opportunity attraction of the services may diminish. Also,
the opening of many occupational fields, which were
previously considered too arduous for women, may reduce the
attraction of the Marine Corps to women.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
Future reenlistment research should construct a variable
which will account for the effects of the selective
reenlistment bonus on reenlistment behavior. This variable
must not only measure the effects of the bonus on those who
received it but must also measure how it affected those who
were eligible for it but did not reenlist. This change
should reduce the disparity in the predictive power of the
model between first and second enlistments.
Further examination of the reenlistment behavior of also
women is necessary. Future research should determine if any
reenlistment behavior differences exist between married and
single females in the Marine Corps.
Future surveys also should reintroduce the question
which asks for an individual's estimation of RMC. This
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would allow testing of the effects of current Marine Corps
policy of annually giving each Marine a written estimate of
his RMC. The survey should also include a question which
attempts to measure an individual's estimate of his personal
combat risk and his attitudes towards serving in combat.
This would allow researchers to more accurately measure the
differences between civilian jobs and the military.
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